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Abstract
Email spam is one of the major problems of the to-
day’s Internet, bringing financial damage to compa-
nies and annoying individual users. Among the ap-
proaches developed to stop spam, filtering is an im-
portant and popular one. In this paper we give an
overview of the state of the art of machine learn-
ing applications for spam filtering, and of the ways
of evaluation and comparison of different filtering
methods. We also provide a brief description of
other branches of anti-spam protection and discuss
the use of various approaches in commercial and non-
commercial anti-spam software solutions.
1 Introduction
The problem of undesired electronic messages is
nowadays a serious issue, as spam constitutes up to
75–80% of total amount of email messages [63]. Spam
causes several problems, some of them resulting in
direct financial losses. More precisely, spam causes
misuse of traffic, storage space and computational
power [86]; spam makes users look through and sort
out additional email, not only wasting their time and
causing loss of work productivity, but also irritat-
ing them and, as many claim, violating their privacy
rights [86]; finally, spam causes legal problems by ad-
vertising pornography, pyramid schemes, etc. [68].
The total worldwide financial losses caused by spam
in 2005 were estimated by Ferris Research Analyzer
Information Service at $50 billion [31].
Lately, Goodman et al. [39] presented an overview
of the field of anti-spam protection, giving a brief
history of spam and anti-spam and describing major
directions of development. They are quite optimistic
in their conclusions, indicating learning-based spam
recognition, together with anti-spoofing technologies
and economic approaches, as one of the measures
which together will probably lead to the final victory
over email spammers in the near future. Presently,
according to the study by Siponen and Stucke [86]
about the use of different kinds of anti-spam tools
and techniques in companies, filtering is the most
popular way of protection from spam. This shows
that spam filtering is, and is likely to remain, an im-
portant practical application of machine learning.
In this paper we give a structured overview of the
existing learning-based approaches to spam filtering.
One section describes the spam phenomenon, includ-
ing a brief overview of non-filtering techniques, which
we think is necessary for understanding the context
in which a spam filter works. Our survey gives a sys-
tematic guide to the present state of the literature,
considering a wide scope of papers, and being thus
complementary to the work of Goodman et al. [39],
who present a concise account of the history of anti-
spam protection and the directions of future develop-
ment. An overview of email classification, including
spam filtering, was previously given by Wang and
Cloete [93]. Compared to their work, we overview
a much wider variety of filtering techniques and pay
more attention to evaluation and comparison of dif-
ferent approaches in the literature.
The survey does not intend to cover neighboring
topics, being devoted to protection from email spam.
In particular, we do not address the issue of viruses
delivered by spam, because we believe that this two
problems, namely spam and viruses, are always dis-
tinguishable enough to be discussed separately: a
virus can be recognized as such without reference to
the way of delivery of it, and a spam message can
be recognized as such both with and without mali-
cious content. Also, we focus on the email spam,
not on spam in general. Though the spam delivered
through instant messengers, blog comments or sys-
tems of voice transmission pursues similar goals, the
technical differences are significant enough to make
the problem of spam in general too complex for one
overview (see, for example, the paper by Park et al.
[72] for discussion of differences between email and
voice spam).
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 is an
introduction to the phenomenon of spam, including
a brief overview of anti-spam efforts not based on
filtering; Section 3 is dedicated to the methods of
machine learning used for spam filtering; Section 4 is
a brief glance on the existing commercial and non-
commercial software solution; Section 5 overviews
evaluation and comparison methods; finally, Section
6 is a conclusion.
2 The Spam Phenomenon
This section provides an introduction to the phe-
nomenon of spam, including the definition and gen-
eral characteristics of spam, as well as a brief
overview of non-filtering methods of anti-spam pro-
tection, namely anti-spam legislation and changes in
the process of email transmission. Not being directly
related to spam filtering, this methods either influ-
ence the ways in which spam can be formed and
transmitted, or provide new architectures in which
a filter can be used. Therefore, a brief introduction
to this methods is needed before passing to filtering
itself.
2.1 Definition and General Character-
istics of Spam
There exist various definitions of what spam (also
called junk mail) is and how it differs from legit-
imate mail (also called non-spam, genuine mail or
ham). The shortest among the popular definitions
characterizes spam as “unsolicited bulk email” [3, 90].
Sometimes the word commercial is added, but this
extension is argued. The TREC Spam Track relies on
a similar definition: spam is “unsolicited, unwanted
email that was sent indiscriminately, directly or in-
directly, by a sender having no current relationship
with the user” [19]. Another widely accepted defini-
tion states that “Internet spam is one or more un-
solicited messages, sent or posted as part of a larger
collection of messages, all having substantially identi-
cal content” [88]. Direct Marketing Association pro-
posed to use the word “spam” only for messages with
certain kinds of content, such as pornography, but
this idea met no enthusiasm, being considered an at-
tempt to legalize other kinds of spam [89]. As we can
see, the common point is that spam is unsolicited,
according to a widely cited formula “spam is about
consent, not content” [90]. It is necessary to men-
tion that the notion of being unsolicited is hard to
capture. In fact, despite the wide agreement on this
type of definitions the filters have to rely on content
and ways of delivery of messages to recognize spam
from legitimate mail. Among the latest work it is in-
teresting to mention Zinman and Donath [106], who
still prefer to rely on content and a user’s personal
judgement to define spam.
There is a growing scientific literature addressing
the characteristics of the spam phenomenon. In gen-
eral, spam is used to advertise different kinds of goods
and services, and the percentage of advertisements
dedicated to a particular kind of goods or services
changes over time [46]. Quite often spam serves the
needs of online frauds. A special case of spamming
activity is phishing, namely hunting for sensitive in-
formation (passwords, credit card numbers, etc.) by
imitating official requests from a trusted authori-
ties, such as banks, server administration or service
providers [24]. Another type of malicious spam con-
tent are viruses [61]. Sometimes a massive spam at-
tack can be used also to upset the work of a mail
server [69]. To sum up, the sender of a spam mes-
sage pursues one of the following tasks: to advertise
some goods, services, or ideas, to cheat users out of
their private information, to deliver malicious soft-
ware, or to cause a temporary crash of a mail server.
From the point of view of content spam is subdivided
not just into various topics but also into several gen-
res, which result from simulating different kinds of
legitimate mail, such as memos, letters, and order
confirmations [21]. Characteristics of spam traffic
are different from those of legitimate mail traffic, in
particular legitimate mail is concentrated on diurnal
periods, while spam arrival rate is stable over time
[35]. Spammers usually mask their identity in differ-
ent ways when sending spam, but they often do not
when they are harvesting email addresses on web-
sites, so recognition of harvesting activities can help
to identify spammers [73]. A very important fact is
that spammers are reactive, namely they actively op-
pose every successful anti-spam effort [29], so that
performance of a new method usually decreases after
its deployment. Pu and Webb [74] analyze the evo-
lution of spamming techniques, showing that meth-
ods of constructing spam become extinct if filters are
effective enough to cope with them or if other suc-
cessful efforts are taken against them. A study of
network-level behavior of spammers by Ramachan-
dran and Feamster [75] showed that the majority of
spam comes from a few concentrated parts of IP ad-
dress space, and that a small subset of sophisticated
spammers use temporary route announcements in or-
der to remain untraceable.
2.2 Anti-Spam Legislation Efforts
The huge and various damage caused by spam, in-
cluding financial loss and violation of laws by broad-
casting prohibited materials, resulted in the need for
a legislative response. Noticeable efforts in this field
are EU Privacy and Electronic Communications Di-
rective, and US CAN-SPAM Act.
The European Parliament passed the Privacy and
Electronic Communications Directive 2002/58/EC in
July 2002. The directive prohibits unsolicited com-
mercial communication unless “prior explicit consent
of the recipients is obtained before such communica-
tions are addressed to them”. An overview of the
directive is given by Lugaresi [61]. In case of Italy,
in particular, Section 130 of “Personal Data Protec-
tion Code” (Legislative Decree no. 196 of 30 June
2003) states that “the use of automated calling sys-
tems without human intervention for the purposes
of direct marketing or sending advertising materials,
or else for carrying out market surveys or interactive
business communication shall only be allowed with
the users consent”.
US CAN-SPAM Act (Controlling the Assault of
Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing Act) of
2003 allows unsolicited commercial email, but places
several restrictions on it. In particular, it demands
to include a physical address of the advertiser and an
opt-out link in each message, to use legitimate return
email address, and to mark the messages clearly as
advertisements, and prohibits to use descriptive sub-
ject lines, to falsify header information, to harvest
email addresses on the Web, and to use illegally cap-
tured third-party computers to relay the messages.
Grimes [42] shows, that the actual compliance with
the CAN-SPAM act was low from the very beginning
and became even lower in the following years, being
equal to about 5.7% in 2006.
For more information on this topic, one may refer
to an analysis of the EU and the US anti-spam leg-
islation by Moustakas et al. [68], and to an overview
of anti-spam legislation of differen countries prepared
by the International Telecommunication Union [47].
2.3 Modifying Email Transmission
Protocols
One of the proposed ways of stopping spam is to en-
hance or even substitute the existing standards of
email transmission by new, spam-proof variants. The
main drawback of the commonly used Simple Mail
Transfer Protocol (SMTP) is that it provides no reli-
able mechanism of checking the identity of the mes-
sage source. Overcoming this disadvantage, namely
providing better ways of sender identification, is the
common goal of Sender Policy Framework (SPF, for-
merly interpreted as Sender Permitted From) [92],
Designated Mailers Protocol (DMP) [30], Trusted
E-Mail Open Standard (TEOS) [82], and SenderID
(sometimes also spelled Sender ID) [85]. A compari-
son and discussion of this kind of proposals is given
by Levine and DeKok [57]. SenderID, being released
in 2004, has grown quite popular already. Accord-
ing to Goodman et al. [39], almost 40% of legitimate
email is today SenderID-compliant. The principle of
its work is the following: the owner of a domain pub-
lishes the list of authorized outbound mail servers,
thus allowing recipients to check, whether a message
which pretends to come from this domain really orig-
inates from there. A discussion of the problem of fake
IP addresses in email messages and ways of overcom-
ing it by changes in standards is given by Goodman
[36].
The idea underlying another group of proposals to
amend the existing protocols is to add a step to the
mail sending process that represents a minor obstacle
for sending few emails, but a major one for sending
great number of messages. Efforts in this direction
were made already in 1992 [28], when it was proposed
to ask sender to compute a moderately hard function
before granting him the permission to sent a mes-
sage. Another proposal [84] was to establish a small
payment for sending an email message, neglible for a
common user, but big enough to prevent a spammer
to broadcast millions of messages. An interesting ver-
sion of this approach is Zmail protocol [51], where a
small fee is paid by the sender to the receiver, so that
a common user who sends and receives nearly equal
amount of messages gets neither damage no profit
from using email, while spamming becomes a costly
operation. Another approach is to use simple tests
that allow the system to distinguish human senders
from robots [12], for example to ask the user to an-
swer a moderately easy question before sending the
message. One disadvantage of this approach is that
such protection is annoying to human senders. Duan
et al. [27] propose to use a differentiated email de-
livery architecture to handle messages from different
classes of senders in different ways. For example, for
some classes messages are kept on the sender’s mail
server until the receiver asks to transmit them to him.
2.4 Local Changes in Email Transmis-
sion Process
Some solutions do not require global protocol changes
but propose to manage email in a different way lo-
cally. Li et al. [59] and Saito [78] propose slowing
down the operations with messages that are likely to
be spam. A similar idea is discussed in the technical
report by Twining et al. [91], who propose to use the
past behavior of senders for fast prediction of mes-
sage category, and then process supposed spam in a
lower priority queue and supposed legitimate mail in
a higher priority queue. In this way the delivery of
legitimate mail is guaranteed, but it becomes hard
to broadcast many spam messages at once. Yamai
et al. [98] pointed out that when a spammer falsifies
the sender identity in the messages, the server cor-
responding to the falsified address receives a great
number of error mails. Yamai and collaborators pro-
pose to solve this problem by using a separate mail
transfer agent for the error messages. Goodman and
Rounthwaite [37] point to the possibility of control-
ling not only ingoing, but also outgoing spam, stop-
ping it on the level of email service provider used by
a spammer.
3 Learning-Based Methods of
Spam Filtering
Filtering is a popular solution to the problem of
spam. It can be defined as automatic classification
of messages into spam and legitimate mail. Existing
filtering algorithms are quite effective, often showing
accuracy of above 90% during the experimental eval-
uation (see, for example, the evaluation performed
by Lai and Tsai [53]). It is possible to apply the
spam filtering algorithms on different phases of email
transmission: at routers (see for example the paper
by Agrawal et al. [1]), at the destination mail server,
or in the destination mailbox. It must be mentioned
that filtering on the destination point solves the prob-
lems caused by spam only partially: a filter prevents
end-users from wasting their time on junk messages,
but it does not prevent resources misuse, because all
the messages are delivered nevertheless.
In general, a spam filter is an application which
implements a function:
f(m, θ) =
{
cspam, if the decision is “spam”
cleg, otherwise
where m is a message to be classified, θ is a vector of
parameters, and cspam and cleg are labels assigned to
the messages.
Most of the spam filters are based on machine
learning classification techniques. In a learning-based
technique the vector of parameters θ is the result of
training the classifier on a pre-collected dataset:
θ = Θ(M),
M = {(m1, y1), ...(mn, yn)}, yi ∈ {cspam, cleg},
where m1,m2, ...mn are previously collected mes-
sages, y1, y2...yn are the corresponding labels, and Θ
is the training function.
According to Fawcett [29], the following peculiar-
ities of spam filtering task cause problems from the
point of view of data mining: skewed class distribu-
tion (the proportion of spam to legitimate mail varies
greatly), unequal and uncertain error costs, disjunc-
tive and changing target concept (the content of spam
changes with time), and reactive adversaries. An-
other problem is the need for sufficient amount of
training data. Addressing this issue, Chan et al. [14]
proposed to use semi-supervised learning, namely a
technique called co-training, for spam filtering. This
technique allows the learner to start off with a small
amount of labeled training data, which is used for
initial training of the classifier, and a larger amount
of unlabeled training data, which is then labeled in
an iterative process and used to train the classifier
better.
For all the algorithms of email classification there
exists the problem of finding a reasonable trade-off
between two types of errors: classifying legitimate
mail as spam and classifying spam as legitimate mail.
While classifying several spam messages as legitimate
mail just annoys the user, the opposite situation may
lead to the actual loss of valuable information. A
solution for finding a trade-off based on game the-
ory is proposed by Androutsopoulos et al. [7]. Also,
Yih et al. [100] propose and discuss two techniques of
training filters with low false positive rates. Never-
theless, we must remember, that different users have
different requests, so it is reasonable to consider the
relative cost of the two types of errors as a user-
defined parameter [66].
The development of a new filter can be simplified
by some existing software tools. Here we can men-
tion Spamato system [2] that provides a uniform user-
friendly software framework for spam filtering algo-
rithms in order to simplify practical implementation
of new filters, and the Email Mining Toolkit (EMT)
[44], a data mining toolkit designed to analyze oﬄine
email corpora.
3.1 What to Analyze?
In order to classify new messages, a spam filter can
analyze them either separately (for example, just
checking the presence of certain words in case of key-
word filtering) or in groups (for example, a filter may
consider that arrival of a dozen of substantially iden-
tical messages in five minutes is more suspicious then
arrival of one message with the same content). In ad-
dition to this, a learning-based filter analyzes a collec-
tion of labeled training data (pre-collected messages
with reliable judgements), and a filter which involves
user collaboration receives also multiple user judge-
ments about some of the new messages for the anal-
ysis.
An email message consists of two parts, namely
body and header. Message body is usually a text
in a natural language, possibly with HTML markup
and graphical elements. Header is a structured set of
fields, each having name, value, and specific meaning.
Some of this fields, like From, To, or Subject, are
standard, and others may depend on the software
involved in message transmission, such as spam filters
installed on mail servers. Subject field contains what
the user sees as the subject of the message and is often
treated as a part of the message body. The body is
(a) Taxonomy.
(b) Example.
Figure 1: What to analyze? Message structure from the point of view of feature selection.
sometimes referred to as the content of the message.
We must mention that non-content features are not
limited to the features of the header. For example, a
filter may consider the message size as a feature [44].
For each method of message analysis its designer
must choose a way of doing feature selection, namely
decide what parts of the messages are relevant for
the analysis. The simplest way of doing feature se-
lection is the ‘bag of words’ model, which represents
the message as an unstructured set of tokens, namely
sequences of chracters separated by spaces and/or
punctuation marks. This model can be used to char-
acterize any part of a message, or a message as a
whole. In this case, presence of a certain word in the
message is considered a binary feature of the mes-
sage. A somewhat more sophisticated approach is
to consider the occurences of same word in different
parts of the message (say, ‘John’ in the message body
and ‘John’ in the ‘From’ field) as different features.
This approach, though makes some use of the mes-
sage structure, does not really exploit the differences
between text in the body and technical information
in the header, so further in the discussion we will
make no difference between this approach and the
plain ‘bag of words’. Also a weighted variant can be
used, when the features are not binary, but reflect
the importance of the token in some way, for exam-
ple the number of occurrences of the token in the
message can be used as the weight of this token. It
is possible to use all the features, or to select top N
features by some measure. Zhang et al. [102] name
three measures that can be used to order the fea-
tures: document frequency, information gain, and χ2
(the definitions are given in Table 1).
Natural language processing provides some alter-
native ways of selecting features from the body. The
most simple way is enhancing the ‘bag of words’
model with stemming (removing affixes) and/or stop-
ping (ignoring the most frequent words). For the
message header analysis, more sophisticated ways of
selecting features take the header structure into ac-
count, extracting only some special kind of informa-
tion. Yeh et al. [99] propose a complex approach
based on meta-heuristics, using knowledge about typ-
ical behaviors of spammers to specify features for rec-
ognizing spam (for example the “From” field empty
or missing, or the date illegal or very old, are con-
sidered signs of spam message). Hershkop [44] uses
a wide range of non-content features, including fea-
tures extracted from the header, such as sender and
recipient email names, domain names and zones, and
general characteristics of the message, such as the
message size and the number of attachments.
3.1.1 Feature extraction for image-based fil-
tering.
Apart from text, a message can also contain graph-
ical images. After the distribution of content-based
filtering techniques, the spammers adopted the use of
image spam. The text of an advertizement is placed
in an image, so that it is impossible to analyze the
message content with plain text-based filters. This
led to the need for filters based on image analysis. In
image-based filtering the main issue is to find features
both relevant and easy to extract, while the classifica-
tion itself can be further perfomed by state-of-the-art
algorithms.
The fully-functional optical character recognition
(OCR) procedure is computationally expensive, so
usually simplified models are proposed to recognize
spam in images. In particular, Aradhye et al. [8] ex-
tract five features from the images, namely the frac-
tion of the image occupied by regions identified as
text, and color saturation and color heterogeneity
calculated separately for text and non-text regions.
A similar approach to feature extraction for image-
based filtering was proposed by Wu et al. [97]. In
addition to detecting the size and the number em-
bedded text regions without actual text recognition,
they characterize a banner as a special kind of im-
age (very narrow in width or height, and with a large
aspect ratio), and use the number of banner-like im-
ages as an additional feature. Lately, Dredze et al.
[25] introduced a new approach, which relies only on
features which take very small time to extract, avoid-
ing not only OCR, but in general any computations
more complicated than simple edge detection. Thus,
the features used in this work are selected among
those that do not require image analysis at all (for
example, file format, height and width of the image,
or file size), and those that are retrieved through very
Measure Formula
Document frequency |{mj |mj ∈M and fi occurs in mj}|
Information gain
∑
c∈{cspam,cleg}
 ∑
f∈{fi,¬fi}
Pˆ (f, c) log
Pˆ (f, c)
Pˆ (f) · Pˆ (c)

χ2 |M | · [Pˆ (fi, cspam) · Pˆ (¬fi, cleg)− Pˆ (fi, cleg) · Pˆ (¬fi, cspam)]2
Pˆ (fi) · Pˆ (¬fi) · Pˆ (cspam) · Pˆ (cleg)
Table 1: Measures of feature relevance used for ordering features. Each measure applies to a feature. M
is the set of all training messages, cspam and cleg are the labels of spam class and legitimate mail class
correspondingly, fi is a binary feature (for example “the word free is present in the message”), and ¬fi
is the negation of the feature fi (for example “the word free is NOT present in the message”). All the
probabilities are estimated with frequencies.
simple analysis of images (for example, average color
or color saturation). Similarly, Wang et al. [94] use
such fast-to-extract features as color histogram, ori-
entation histograms, and coefficients of wavelet trans-
formation of the image. All this methods showed
reasonably high accuracy, but, as explicitly stated
by Dredze et al. [25], such approaches are vulnerable
to reactivity. It can be well seen on the example of
features used to characterize banners, which can ob-
viously be easily avoided by spammers and already
today are unlikely to be helpful.
Despite the general desire to avoid OCR for the
reasons of low speed, Fumera et al. [32] note that
it may be reasonable to apply OCR-based recogni-
tion in the rare cases when simpler filters are unable
to provide a confident decision. They show that ap-
plication of state-of-the-art text categorization tech-
niques to the text extracted from the images can be
quite efficient. Providing positive results, they nev-
ertheless observe that the spammers can easily react
by applying techniques which will pose problems to
OCR without decreasing human readability of text
– ironically, the same techniques which are used in
the tests designed to distinguish human senders from
robots.
3.2 How to Analyze?
The first filters were based plainly on checking pres-
ence of certain predefined tokens in the message body
(keyword filtering) or in the information about the
sender (blacklist/whitelist filtering). Though this ap-
proches are not themselves learning-based, it is nec-
essary to mention them in the beginning of this sec-
tion, because a great number of later filters are in
fact sophisticated improvements of the same two ini-
tial ideas. While keword filtering was completely re-
placed by its learning-based descendants (primarly
Na¨ıve Bayes), blacklists and whitelists are used un-
til now as parts of more complex anti-spam solutions
[66]; apart from personal blacklists, the public up-
to-date registers of known spammers exist (see for
example [49]) and are widely used. One more related
method is greylisting [43], when a message which is
neither in the whitelist nor in the blacklist is tem-
porarily rejected; if an attempt of transmission on the
same message is held later, the message is accepted.
This method rests on the assumption that spammers
do not always retry sending their messages, and those
who do will probably be listed in public blacklists
during the time gap between the two attempts.
Below we provide short descriptions of the existing
filtering methods.
3.2.1 Methods Based on Bag-of-Words Fea-
ture Extraction
Learning-based spam filters that treat the input data
as an unstructured set of tokens, can be applied both
to the whole message and to any part of it. For this
group of filters we can state the problem as follows.
Let there be two classes of messages: spam and legiti-
mate mail. Let us than have a set of labeled training
messages, each message being a vector of d binary
features and each label being cspam or cleg depend-
ing on the class of the message. Thus, the training
data set M, once pre-processed in this way, can be
described as:
X = {(x¯1, y1), (x¯2, y2), ..., (x¯n, yn)},
x¯i ∈ Zd2, yi ∈ {cspam, cleg},
where d is the number of features used. Then, given
a new sample x¯ ∈ Zd2 the classifier should provide a
decision y ∈ {cspam, cleg}.
Na¨ıve Bayes. In 1998 the Na¨ıve Bayes classifier
was proposed for spam recognition [71, 77]. It be-
came widely known and used due to Paul Graham’s
popular article “A Plan for Spam” [40]. This clas-
sifier, when applied to text, can be considered an
improved learning-based variant of keyword filtering.
It rests on the so-called naive independence assump-
tion, namely that all the features are statistically in-
dependent. The basic decision rule can be defined as
follows:
f(x¯) = argmax
y={cspam,cleg}
Pˆ (y) ∏
j:xj=1
Pˆ (xj = 1|y)
 ,
where xj is the jth component of the vector x¯, Pˆ (y)
and Pˆ (xj = 1|y) are probabilities estimated using the
training data. Several variants of Na¨ıve Bayes were
applied to spam filtering, an overview and compar-
ison of them can be found in the article by Metsis
et al. [65]. Though the classifier is very fast as it
is, Li and Zhong [58] proposed to make it even faster
by using approximate classification techniques. Their
version of the algorithm achieves significant increase
in speed without loosing much in accuracy.
k-Nearest Neighbor. The k-Nearest Neighbor (k-
NN) classifier was proposed for spam filtering by An-
droutsopoulos et al. [5]. With this classifies the de-
cision is made as follows: k nearest training samples
are selected using a predefined similarity function,
and then the message x¯ is labeled as belonging to the
same class as the majority among this k samples.
Support Vector Machines. Another classifier pro-
posed for spam filtering is Support Vector Machine
(SVM) [26]. Given the training samples and a pre-
defined transformation Φ : Rd → F , which maps the
features to a transformed feature space, the classifier
separates the samples of the two classes with a hy-
perplane in the transformed feature space, building a
decision rule of the following form:
f(x¯) = sign
(
n∑
i=1
αiyiK(x¯i, x¯) + b
)
,
where K(u¯, v¯) = Φ(u¯) · Φ(v¯) is the kernel function
and αi, i = 1..n and b maximize the margin of the
separating hyperplane. The value −1 corresponds to
cleg, 1 corresponds to cspam. SVM was proposed in
particular to classify the vectors of features extracted
from images [8].
Lately two improvements of this method of filter-
ing appeared. Sculley and Wachman [83] proposed a
version of SVM, called Relaxed Online SVM, which
reduces greatly the computational cost of updating
the hypothesis, in particular by training only on ac-
tual errors. Blanzieri and Bryl [9] presented an SVM-
based filtering algorithm which improves the accu-
racy by using locality in the spam phenomenon.
Term Frequency-Inverse Document Frequency.
The name Term Frequency-Inverse Document Fre-
quency (TF-IDF) actually applies to a term-
weighting scheme, which is defined as follows:
wij = tfij · log n
dfi
,
where wij is the weight of ith term (token) in the
jth document (message), tfij is the number of occur-
rences of the ith term in the jth document, dfi is the
number of messages in which the ith term occurs, and
n, as above, is the total number of documents in the
training set. This scheme can be combined with the
Rocchio algorithm, a detailed description of which
can be found in the paper by Joachims [48]. Such
combination results in a quite accurate classifier [26],
which is sometimes also referred to as TF-IDF in the
literature.
Boosting. Boosting is a general name for the algo-
rithms based on the idea of combining many hypothe-
ses (for example one-level decision trees). At each
stage of the classification procedure a weak (not very
accurate) learner is trained, and its output is used
to reweight the data for the future stages: greater
weight is assigned to the samples which are misclas-
sified. For spam filtering boosting was proposed by
Carreras and Ma´rquez [13].
3.2.2 Language-based filters
Another group of methods uses the fact that the mes-
sage body is a text in a natural language. We must
mention that methods discussed in this section can in
practice be applied also to message headers or whole
messages, however the motivation proposed in the
literature for their application on spam filtering re-
lies on the fact that they are effective in natural lan-
guage text classification. In fact, the same motiva-
tion can as well be appled to the methods based on
compression models, namely dynamic Markov com-
pression and prediction by partial matching, which
were nevertheless successfuly used with the data ex-
tracted from both bodies and headers of the messages
[11].
Chi by degrees of freedom. This method, which is
usually used for document authorship identification,
is proposed for spam filtering by O’Brien and Vogel
[70]. Messages are represented in terms of charac-
ter or word N -grams. The idea of the method is
to compare the similarity of a new message to the
labeled messages using the chi-by-degrees-of-freedom
test, which is calculated by dividing the value of the
χ2 test by the number of degrees of freedom.
Smoothed N -gram language models. Medlock [64]
used smoothed higher-order N -gram models. N -
gram language models are based on the assumption
that the existence of a certain word at a certain posi-
tion in a sequence depends only of the previous N−1
words.
3.2.3 Filters based on non-content features
The methods based on structured analysis of the
header and of meta-level features, such as number of
attachments, use specific technical aspects of email
and so they are specific to spam filtering.
Analyzing SMTP path. Leiba et al. [56] present
a filtering method based on analyzing IP addresses
in the reverse-path and ascribing reputation to them
according to amount of spam and legitimate mail de-
livered through them. Both this and the subsequent
method can be viewed as development of the idea of
blacklisting and whitelisting.
Analyzing the user’s social network. The algorithm
proposed by Boykin and Roychowdhury [10] analyzes
‘From’, ‘To’, ‘Cc’ and ‘Bcc’ fields of the message
headers in order to build a graph of social relations of
the user, and then uses this graph in order to classify
new messages. The idea of extracting the user’s so-
cial network from his mailbox was further developed
by Chirita et al. [15] and by Golbeck and Hendler
[34].
Analyzing behaviors. Behavior-based filtering rests
on extracting knowledge about the behavior behind
a given message or group of messages from their non-
content features, and comparing it to predefined or
extracted knowledge about the typical behaviors of
malicious and normal users. Examples are the works
of Yeh et al. [99], and Hershkop [44], both already
mentioned in Section 3.1. Yeh et al. [99] use well-
known behaviors of spammers, such as using incor-
rect dates. Hershkop [44] proposes a number of be-
havior models, among them recipient frequency and
histograms of user’s past activity, that are based on
non-content features and can be used to detect spam
and viruses as anomalies in the email flow.
3.2.4 Collaborative spam filtering
Certain efforts are made to achieve better spam fil-
tering through the collaboration of users. The usual
way of such collaboration is sharing the knowledge
about spam between P2P users [54, 104], or gath-
ering spam reports from the users on a mail server
(like in Google’s Gmail1). In such situation of data
exchange between users the issue of privacy arises.
Damiani et al. [22] propose a privacy-preserving ap-
proach to P2P spam filtering system. In particular,
spam reports in their system are sent without indi-
cating the user who is the source of the report. Mo
et al. [67] propose a multi-agent system for collabo-
rative spam filtering, in which each message is first
1http://gmail.google.com/
classified as spam, legitimate mail or suspicious mail
by a local agent, and only for suspicious messages
the collaborative judgement is requested. While usu-
ally the users are proposed to exchange opinions or
information about emails, Garg et al. [33] propose
to exchange trained filters instead, thus significantly
reducing the amount of data transmitted. Another
interesting effort for collaborative spam fighting is
Project Honey Pot [45], intended to identify email
address harvesters with the help of specially gener-
ated email addresses.
3.2.5 Hybrid approaches
We must mention that it is also possible to combine
different algorithms, especially if they use unrelated
features to produce a solution [56, 102].
3.2.6 Overview of the methods
In Table 2 we give a wide list of the spam filtering
algorithms proposed in the literature. In the same
cell of the table we group similar algorithms that are
based on the same idea but may have some differ-
ences. For example, Drucker et al. [26] use C4.5 de-
cision trees as a weak learner for boosting algorithm,
and Androutsopoulos et al. [6] use regression stumps.
Here we refer only to the articles directly related to
spam filtering, but many of the listed methods were
known and used for other tasks before. In particular
we must mention that RIPPER and TF-IDF classi-
fiers were applied to the similar task of email classi-
fication by topic as early as 1996 [17].
3.3 Opposing Reactivity
The methods of spamming are improving together
with the methods of spam filtering. Spammers try
to attack filters, namely to decrease filtering effec-
tiveness. Following the systematization proposed by
Wittel andWu [95] we can categorize attacks on spam
filters in the following way:
 Tokenization attacks, when the spammer in-
tends to prevent correct tokenization of the mes-
sage by splitting or modifying features, for ex-
ample putting extra spaces in the middle of the
words.
 Obfuscation attacks, when the content of the
message is obscured from the filter, for example
by means of encoding.
 Statistical attacks, when the spammer intends
to skew the message’s statistics. If the data used
for a statistical attack is purely random, the at-
tack is called weak ; otherwise it is called strong.
An example of strong statistical attack is good
word attack [60].
The reactivity of spammers requires countermea-
sures from filter developers, so in the field of spam
filtering a direction appeared which we may call op-
posing reactivity. For example, a popular trick of
spammers is to misspell the most ‘spam-like’ words,
for example writing ‘vi@gra’ instead of ‘viagra’. A
way to solve this problem using hidden Markov model
is proposed by Lee and Ng [55]. Also we can mention
that the whole issue of image spam initially arose
as a part of the problem of reactivity, and so the
image-based spam filtering as such can be considered
opposition to reactivity.
4 Commercial and Non-
Commercial Software So-
lutions
Spam filtering is not only a subject of scientific re-
search, but also a wide and well-established field
of software development. Available commercial and
non-commercial solutions combine different tech-
niques of message filtering. Moreover, they use pro-
tocol extensions and are sometimes integrated into
single software solutions with anti-virus protection.
An overview of some products is given in Table 3.
The meanings of the column titles are as follows:
 Whitelists/blacklists: use of various personal
and public blacklists and whitelists;
 Managing replies: using additional mecha-
nisms to ensure that replies to the user’s mes-
sages are not classified as spam;
Method
Can be Applied
Used in
applied to to
RIPPER B,H,W B [26]
Stacking B,H,W B [79, 105]
Na¨ıve Bayes B,H,W B,H,W [5, 4, 3, 6, 14, 41, 53, 62, 71, 77,
102, 105]
Flexible Bayes B,H,W B [6]
Boosting B,H,W B,H,W [6, 13, 26, 102, 105]
Maximum Entropy Model B,H,W B,H,W [101, 102]
Support Vector Machines B,H,W B,H,W [6, 9, 14, 26, 52, 53, 83, 96, 102, 105]
k-NN B,H,W B,H,W [5, 23, 53, 80, 102, 105]
Centroid-based B,H,W B [87]
TF-IDF B,H,W B,H,W [53, 26]
Pattern discovery B,H,W B [76]
Self-organizing Feature B,H,W B [62]
Maps (SOM)
Learning Vector B,H,W B [16]
Quantization (LVQ)
Committee Machines B,H,W B [107]
Compression Models B,H,W B,W [11]
Clustering B,H,W B [81]
Rough Set Based Model B,H,W B [103]
χ By Degrees Of Freedom B B [70]
Smoothed N-gram B B [64]
Modelling
SMTP-path Analysis H H [56]
Social Networks H H [10, 15]
Table 2: Spam Filtering Algorithms. The following abbreviations are used: B - body, H - header, W - whole
message.
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Server-side software solutions
Symantec Mail Secu-
rity for SMTP
+ + + + + Not stated
on the site
MailCleaner + + + + + + Complex
sys. of
prices
Solutions suitable both for client and server side
SpamAssassin + + + Free
Bogofilter + + Free
Client-side software solutions
CA Anti-Spam + + + ¿39.95
Vanquish vqME + + + + $34.95/year
Cloudmark Desktop + $39.95
Allume Spam-
Catcher
+ + + $29.99
MailWasher Pro + + $37
POPFile + + Free
Spamihilator + + + + Free
SpamPal + Free
K9 + + + Free
G-Lock SpamCom-
bat
+ + + Free
Software solutions supplied with a hardware base
BorderWare Email
Security Gateway
+ + + + + + Not stated
on the site
Barracuda Spam
Firewall
+ + + + + Complex
sys. of
prices
Table 3: Methods used in some software anti-spam solutions. The meanings of the column titles are explained
in Section 4. The addresses of websites are given in Table 4.
Product Website address
Symantec Mail Secu-
rity for SMTP
http://www.symantec.com/enterprise/products/
overview.jsp?pvid=845_1
MailCleaner http://www.mailcleaner.net/
SpamAssassin http://spamassassin.apache.org/
Bogofilter http://bogofilter.sourceforge.net/
CA Anti-Spam http://home3.ca.com/STContent/landingpages/Products/
Antispam/ASPM001/index.aspx
Vanquish vqME https://www.vqme.com/
Cloudmark Desktop http://cloudmark.com/desktop/
Allume SpamCatcher http://www.allume.com/win/spamcatcher/
MailWasher Pro http://www.mailwasher.net/
POPFile http://popfile.sourceforge.net/
Spamihilator http://www.spamihilator.com/
SpamPal http://www.spampal.org/
K9 http://keir.net/k9.html
G-Lock
SpamCombat
http://www.glocksoft.com/sc/
BorderWare Email
Security Gateway
http://www.borderware.com/products/
email-security-gateway/
Barracuda Spam
Firewall
http://www.barracudanetworks.com/ns/products/
spam_overview.php
Table 4: Addresses of the official websites of the products presented in Table 3.
 Using decoy accounts: collecting spam mes-
sages on decoy accounts for future extraction of
fingerprints or rules;
 Protocol extensions: support of protocol
extensions intended to prevent falsifying the
sender’s identity or to ensure that a message is
legitimate by asking the sender for confirmation;
 Anti-virus/anti-spyware : integrating an
anti-virus and/or anti-spyware solution into the
same product;
 User collaboration: support of sharing data
about spam among the users of the product;
 Message analysis: methods of filtering more
sophisticated than blacklisting and whitelisting;
 Bayesian: Bayesian algorithm is used for mes-
sage analysis, probably in combination with
other techniques;
 Image analysis: use of algorithms of analysis
of graphical content;
 Downloading updates: the product regu-
larly downloads updates for its database from
a server;
 Price: the price of the product as given on the
official site, as of May, 2007.
The table is based only on the explicit statements
on the official websites of the products, and thus may
be incomplete. It does not provide real performance
comparison and is not intended to advice any choice
between this products, but rather to show which tech-
niques are used in practical solutions. We do not in-
clude the information about the effectiveness of the
solutions into the table, because it is stated only for
few products, and sometimes the accuracy is claimed
to be 100%, which seems rather a marketing slogan
than a piece of information that can be used for com-
parison.
We can see that practical solutions often combine
various ways of blacklisting and whitelisting with
more complex filtering methods. An interesting point
is that many products use Bayesian filtering. The
reason for this is probably the following: approaches
based on Na¨ıve Bayes, though shown by many stud-
ies to be slightly outperformed by other techniques,
have the advantage of being very fast and fit for con-
tinuous on-line training.
5 Method Evaluation and
Comparison
The great number and variety of spam filtering meth-
ods results in the need for evaluation and comparison
of them. The usual way of testing a filter is applying
it to a corpus of previously gathered mail messages
sorted into spam and legitimate mail. The most sim-
ple measure used to express the results of such testing
is filtering accuracy, namely percentage of messages
classified correctly [53], which has the disadvantage
of making no difference between false positives and
false negatives. More informative measures are spam
recall and spam precision. Androutsopoulos et al. [4]
propose to use the relational cost λ of the two types
of errors as a variable parameter, and introduce sev-
eral new measures based on it: weighted accuracy,
weighted error rate, and a total cost ratio (TCR).
TCR is the relative cost of using the filter (and so
having some false positives and some false negatives)
to using no filter at all (and so having all the spam
misclassified, but all the legitimate mail classified cor-
rectly). Table 5 gives the formulae of the measures
named above. It is also possible to test a filter in real-
life conditions. A straightforward way is to use it on
one’s mailbox or mail server. Nevertheless, such test-
ing, having the advantage of using up-to-date data,
is more time-consuming (Michelakis et al. [66] chose
a period of seven months to test their filter). Usually
a previously known method is tested simultaneously
in the same way to provide a quality baseline. The
Na¨ıve Bayes classifier is often chosen for this purpose.
However, Na¨ıve Bayes has already been shown to be
outperformed by many other methods (see for exam-
ple [13, 102, 16]), so now a more accurate baseline
method is needed, for example Support Vector Ma-
chines, as done by Sasaki and Shinnou [81].
Some mail corpora are made publicly available by
their editors. The list of public corpora is given in
Table 7. The properties of spam change with time,
so the older is a corpus, the less the results can be
accepted as an estimation of present real-world per-
formance. We must mention here that the LingSpam
corpus, being rather old, is still actively used, and this
may lead to out-of-date performance results. Cre-
ation of new public corpora is slowed down by pri-
vacy issues: people are certainly unwilling to publish
their private email. For this reason some studies use
either corpora that are not publicly available [56, 99],
or both private and public corpora [18, 53]. One
of the largest public sources of legitimate mail for
experiments, the so-called Enron Corpus2 [50], was
made available during the legal investigation. The
data from this repository was later included in the
Spam Track 2005 corpus and Enron-Spam corpora.
Being against publishing their legitimate mail, peo-
ple usually do not object publishing spam from their
mailboxes, so it is possible to collect a really large
repository of pure spam. For example, SpamArchive
project proposes over 220,000 spam messages for ex-
perimental needs.
Some studies are dedicated to comparison of more
than two filters [6, 26, 53, 102]. In particular, Lai and
Tsai [53] make a complex comparison of four different
methods (Na¨ıve Bayes, SVM, k-nearest neighbor, and
TF-IDF) applied to different parts of a message and
show that, at least on their corpora, analyzing the
header usually gives better results than analyzing the
body or the whole message. According to the results
presented by Zhang et al. [102], the highest TCR is
achieved by using both headers and bodies, but using
header alone again leads to better results than using
body alone. A comparison of 44 spam filters supplied
by 12 groups of developers was performed on Spam
Track3 on the Text Retrieval Conference (TREC) in
2005. According to the final report [18], the best per-
formance was shown by one of the filters supplied by
Jozˇef Stefan Institute and based on compression mod-
els [11], able to achieve spam misclassification rate
of 1.17% with false positive rate of 0.1%. Another
method which showed high resuls was gradient de-
scent of a logistic regression model [38]. The method
of testing used in this competition is different from
2Available at http://www-2.cs.cmu.edu/˜enron/
3http://plg.uwaterloo.ca/˜gvcormac/spam/
Measure Formula
Accuracy nL→L+nS→SnL→L+nL→S+nS→L+nS→S
Error rate nL→S+nS→LnL→L+nL→S+nS→L+nS→S
False positive rate nL→SnL→L+nL→S
Spam recall nS→SnS→L+nS→S
Spam precision nS→SnL→S+nS→S
Weighted accuracy λ·nL→L+nS→Sλ·(nL→L+nL→S)+nS→L+nS→S
Weighted error rate λ·nL→S+nS→Lλ·(nL→L+nL→S)+nS→L+nS→S
Total cost ratio nS→L+nS→Sλ·nL→S+nS→L
ROC curve True positive rate plotted against false positive rate
Table 5: Measures of filtering performance. Following Androutsopoulos et al. [4], nL→L and nS→S are the
numbers of legitimate and spam messages classified correctly, nL→S and nS→L are the numbers of legitimate
and spam messages misclassified, and λ is the relative cost of the two types of errors.
Corpus Available At
PU1, PU2, PU3, PUA, LingSpam http://www.aueb.gr/users/ion/publications.html
Enron-Spam datasets (Enron1, Enron2,
Enron3, Enron4, Enron5, Enron6)
Spamassassin http://spamassassin.apache.org/publiccorpus/
ZH1 Chinese http://homepages.inf.ed.ac.uk/s0450736/spam/
GenSpam http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/users/bwm23/
Spam Track corpus http://plg.uwaterloo.ca/˜gvcormac/spam/
Spambase http://www.ics.uci.edu/˜mlearn/MLSummary.html
SpamArchive http://www.spamarchive.org/
Table 6: Public Data Repositories.
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PU1 1,099 44% NO YES 2000 [3, 6, 11, 102]
PU2 721 20% NO YES 2003 [6]
PU3 4,139 44% NO YES 2003 [6, 11]
PUA 1,142 50% NO YES 2003 [6]
LingSpam 2,893 17% NO NO 2000 [4, 11, 62, 79, 81, 102, 105, 107]
Spamassassin 6,047 31% YES NO 2002 [9, 11, 53, 16, 102]
ZH1 Chinese 1,633 74% YES YES 2004 [102]
GenSpam 41,404 78% NO NO 2005 [64]
Spam Track 92,189 57% YES NO 2005 [11, 18, 38]
corpus
Enron1 5172 29% NO NO 2006 [65]
Enron2 5857 26% NO NO 2006 [65]
Enron3 5512 27% NO NO 2006 [65]
Enron4 6000 75% NO NO 2006 [65]
Enron5 5175 71% NO NO 2006 [65]
Enron6 6000 75% NO NO 2006 [65]
Spambase 4,601 39% NO YES 1999 [103]
SpamArchive over 100% YES NO -
220,000
Table 7: Description of Public Data. ‘YES’ in the ‘Encrypted’ field means that tokens in the messages are
encrypted to address personal privacy, or (in Spambase) only some extracted features of the messages are
present in the corpus.
Id Paper Corpora used
A1 [5] LingSpam
A2 [3] PU1
A3 [6] PU1, PU2, PU3 and PUA
Dr [26] Two specially created repositories
Ca [13] PU1
Ch [16] SpamAssassin
LT [53] SpamAssassin and a specially created repository
Le [56] Specially created repository
LZ [62] LingSpam
OV [70] Specially created repository
SS [81] LingSpam
So [87] Specially created repository
Z1 [102] PU1, LingSpam, SpamAssassin and ZH1
ZZ [103] Spambase database
Z2 [105] LingSpam
Zo [107] LingSpam
Table 8: Papers that present comparisons of two or more filtering techniques.
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A2 Keyword Filtering
A3 A3
Ca
Z1
Z2
Zo
Z1 A3
LT
Z1
Z2
A1
LT
So
Z1
Z2
LT Le LZ Z2 Ch So Zo ZZ OV Na¨ıve Bayes
A3 A3 Flexible Bayes
Dr Dr Dr RIPPER
Z1 A3
Dr
Z1
Z2
Z1
Z2
Dr Z2 Zo Boosting
Z1 Z1 Maximum Entropy
Model
LT
Z1
Z2
Dr
LT
Z2 SS Support Vector
Machines
LT Z2 So k-NN
TF-IDF
SMTP-path Analysis
SOM
Learning Model
of Zhou
LVQ
Centroid-based
Committee Machines
Clustering
Rough Set Based
Model
χ by Degrees of Free-
dom
Table 9: Comparison of Spam Filtering Algorithms in the Literature. For references to the articles see table
8.
Figure 2: Graphical Comparison of Spam Filtering Algorithms in the Literature. An arrow from method A
to method B with references on it means that A is outperformed by B according to the given article(s). An
arrow is put only if there is an explicit claim on the relative performance of the two methods in the article.
For references to the articles see table 8.
the usual one. Instead of commonly used oﬄine test-
ing, when the corpus is split into training and testing
data, on-line testing is used: each message is first
classified by the filter and then added to the train-
ing data. In this way the testing process emulates
the real-life situation where the user corrects the er-
rors made by the filter, so that the amount of train-
ing data gradually increases. Cormack and Bratko
[20] discussed the differences between the testing ap-
proaches used in Spam Treck and other comparisons.
They showed that, though there are important dif-
ferences between batch and on-line evaluation, the
methods which performed well on Spam Track also
show good results being tested in a more conserva-
tive way. TREC Spam Filter Evaluation Tool Kit is
available for download from the Spam Track website
together with the data corpus. The approach used
to create this corpus is described by Cormack and
Lynam [19]. Competitions of spam filters were also
arranged within TREC 20064, ECML/PKDD 20065,
and CEAS 2007 conferences6.
4http://trec.nist.gov/pubs/trec15/t15 proceedings.html
5http://www.ecmlpkdd2006.org/challenge.html
6http://www.ceas.cc/2007/challenge/challenge.html
There is a a wide literature presenting comparison
of small groups of filters, apart from the public com-
petitions. In Table 8 we give a list of papers that
present comparisons of two or more filtering tech-
niques. In Table 9 we propose a systematization of
comparisons of spam filtering methods presented in
literature. Figure 2 represents the results of this com-
parisons. We must state here that accuracy and relia-
bility of different comparisons presented in the tables
may differ depending on data, ways of preprocessing,
and peculiarities of methods of comparison. As a con-
sequence, different comparisons cannot be combined
in order to give some final judgement. For example,
Leiba et al. [56] show that pure SMTP-path analysis
is outperformed by Na¨ıve Bayes on their repository,
conversely Zhao and Zhang [103] show that Rough
Set Based Model outperforms Na¨ıve Bayes on the
data from Spambase database. Obviously, this in-
formation is not enough to judge the relative perfor-
mance of SMTP-path analysis and Rough Set Based
Model.
Apart from the widely used accuracy measures,
some other features are evaluated in different stud-
ies. Drucker et al. [26] and Zhou et al. [105] evaluate
the classification speed. Boykin and Roychowdhury
[10] analyze possible countermeasures that spammers
may take to cheat the filter. Androutsopoulos et al.
[4] evaluate the dependence of performance on train-
ing data size and attribute set size. For Spam Track,
Cormack and Lynam [18] use learning curves to see
how filter performance changes with time if the user
retrains the filter continuously by correcting most of
the classification errors.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we discussed the problem of spam and
gave an overview of learning-based spam filtering
techniques. There is no common definition of what
spam is, but most of the sources agree that the core
feature of the phenomenon is that spam messages
are unsolicited. Spam causes a number of problems
of both economical and ethical nature, which results
in particular in the attempts of legislative definition
and prohibition of spam. An important feature of
the phenomenon of spam is the reactivity of spam-
mers, in other words active intelligent opposition to
every useful anti-spam technique. Another feature is
the changeability of spam, which results partly from
the reactivity of spammers, but also from changing
content of the spam messages. One of the issues re-
lated to reactivity, namely falsification of the sender’s
identity, is fought by means of protocol extension. A
serious obstacle for such approaches is that a new pro-
tocol must be willingly accepted by a great number of
users to become really beneficial. At present at least
one such solution, SenderID, has gained reasonable
popularity, thus starting to influence the situation.
The most popular and well-developed approach to
anti-spam is learning-based filtering. The current
state of the art includes lots of filters based on various
classification techniques applied to different parts of
email messages. In the field of spam filtering the re-
activity of spammers is noticeable, and attempts are
made to predict and prevent the spammers’ coun-
termeasures. In general, local spam filtering has the
drawback of solving the problem of spam only par-
tially, because a filter saves user’s time, but do not
prevent resource misuse. The issue of changeabil-
ity has no final solution yet, as it can be seen in
particular from the necessity of frequent updates of
databases in the commercial anti-spam software.
The great number of proposed filtering techniques
causes the need for systematic evaluation and com-
parison. Efforts are made in this direction: evalua-
tion methods and measures are proposed and repos-
itories for testing are created, though the amount of
experimental data publicly available is limited be-
cause of privacy issues. In the last years, the evalua-
tion field became more systematic due to centralized
contests of filters, such as the ones held within TREC,
ECML/PKDD and CEAS conferences. Still, there
exists no way to measure filter’s stability against the
reactivity of spammers. Apart from this, the increas-
ing accuracy of the solutions will probably soon re-
sult in a situation where a big number of benchmark
datasets will be required for real comparison of lead-
ing solutions.
From our overview of the field we can draw the
following conclusions:
1. Spam filtering is quite effective, making the sit-
uation tolerable and thus probably being the
cause of the slowness with which the useful pro-
tocol extensions are accepted by users. Because
of the sufficient accuracy of the existing solu-
tions, more attention is now given to narrower
subtasks, such as analysis of image-based spam
or coping with reactivity.
2. The reactivity of spammers is a major problem,
and careful analysis of possible countermeasures
is required for any new approach. The challenge
to machine learning is to provide classification
algorithms that are robust with respect to varia-
tion of the data that depends on classifier itself.
As this ideal final goal seems to be unreachable
as yet, in practice the providers of anti-spam
techniques rather aim to be just more reactive
then spammers, responding to new spamming
techniques before they spread widely enough to
change the balance.
A relevant issue is the influence of protocol-based
and legislative approaches on the spam filtering prob-
lem. The increasing spread of SenderID gives hope
that the issue of falsifying the message source will
soon be finally solved, thus limiting the range of
methods of message obfuscation available to spam-
mers and contributing to the accuracy of methods
based on the analysis of the information contained in
the header. The legislative approaches, in their turn,
do not seem to influence the situation significantly,
and no crucial improvement is likely to come in the
near future.
In conclusion, we can say that the field of anti-spam
protection is by now mature and well-developed.
Then a question arises, why our inboxes are still of-
ten full of spam? Reactivity of spammers plays a role
surely, but the countermeasures for their new tricks
are proposed fast enough. So a possible answer is
that we do not protect against spam in all the avail-
able ways. In other words, one point, which should
always be remembered by end users, is that the anti-
spam technologies should be not only designed and
developed, but also deployed and used.
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